When I played college basketball, getting paid (legally) for your services or your likeness was impossible. But I still heard stories of athletes receiving extra benefits—cars, cash, trips, shoes, and VIP treatment. We also knew about the NCAA investigations and sanctions of athletics programs like Syracuse and my beloved UNLV, which was still under fire when I played there, as a result.
I must admit I was never offered any extra benefits. And I was thrilled to be featured—even if by number and rough likeness, only—in the annual releases of the NCAA 2K basketball video game. I was equally thrilled that “video game-JO” was not terrible on the court. In fact, he finished layups in transition, played good defense, and had an afro as I often did at the time, which was cool. But I digress.
NCAA eligibility carries completely new meaning these days; and financial implications that can change athletes’ lives. And as a result, there is litigation across the country about who can play where—and for how long.
The Robinson v. NCAA case is one example.
There, four athlete plaintiffs challenge NCAA rulings that they are eligible to continue competing in college football at West Virginia University, which they each joined after playing football at junior colleges and other schools. In denying the athletes ongoing eligibility, the NCAA argued they are not eligible under NCAA Bylaws 12.8, 12.02.6, and 14.3.3 because their eligibility clocks have run out.
The plaintiffs’ collegiate careers began in either 2018 or 2019, and each competed in 2021, although some of their schools did not have seasons in 2020 due to COVID. Their lawsuit seeks an injunction stopping the NCAA from enforcing rules that would stop them from playing this season for West Virginia University. To that end, on August 8, 2025, the players filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which the State of West Virginia supported by filing its own brief. The NCAA opposed the motion, which was ultimately granted on August 20, 2025. Below is a summary of the Court’s opinion and key findings:
The Court’s Order extensively details plaintiffs’ careers, as well as the parties’ legal arguments. Ultimately, the Judge had to decide whether the plaintiffs could show a likelihood of success on their claim that the NCAA is violating antitrust law, likelihood that they would be irreparably harmed if the judge did not step in to allow them to play, and that allowing them to play was the more equitable outcome and in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (providing the legal standard relied on by the Judge in the Robinson case). Finding they met this burden, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion.
Here are some takeaways.
- The NCAA’s Rules are now commercial in nature.
Back when athletes could not be compensated by their school or anyone else due to amateurism rules, the NCAA was on sound legal footing claiming its eligibility rules were not commercial. But as the Robinson Court explained, “the NIL era, in many ways, blurs the lines between clearly commercial rules and those eligibility rules once thought to be explicitly not-commercial.” Ultimately concluding that the NCAA eligibility rules “dictate the number of years a student-athlete can market and profit from an NCAA Division I career,” the Court found that the rules are commercial in nature, citing also to the settlement in In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, 2025 WL 1675820 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2025).
- The NCAA’s rulings on these players improperly restricted competition.
Tasked with evaluating whether the NCAA eligibility ruling against the plaintiffs harmed competition (violating antitrust laws), the Court considered whether plaintiffs had any evidence of that harm. Plaintiffs argued the rules exclude “a qualified cohort—namely, JUCO athletes” and distorts the labor market for NCAA Division I football players “by pushing student-athletes to attend NCAA member institutions” so they can compete for NIL compensation, “even if junior college might otherwise be a better choice academically or athletically.”
The Court further explained that “[t]he math is simple: ‘each season of JUCO participation costs a football player one year of NCAA eligibility.” Under these circumstances, the Court found that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood that the eligibility rules “have a substantial anti-competitive effect in the labor market for college football.”
- The NCAA’s rationale was insufficient.
In granting the injunction, the Court rejected the NCAA’s explanations for its rulings. In short, the NCAA argued the rules preserve intercollegiate athletics as a “unique offering,” expand athletic output and improve quality of output, and better align athletics and academics. One of the Court’s bases for disagreement with the NCAA relates to the transfer portal.
Whereas the NCAA argued that expanding eligibility for plaintiffs would cause other athletes to lose opportunities, the Court pointed to the transfer portal which allows schools to go to the portal to “fill roster spots for the next season,” rather than signing an “incoming freshman player.” In short, the NCAA’s transfer rules allow schools to opt for more experienced players as they see fit—thus, according to the Court, former JUCO players should be treated no differently.
- College students suffer irreparable harm when they are denied the opportunity to play sports.
Plaintiffs argued the opportunity to play major college sports is so unique and fleeting that destroying “even a small part of it for no reason constitutes irreparable harm.” In response, the NCAA made various arguments, which the Court rejected, concluding it had “no trouble” finding that “the denial to play sports is irreparable harm” and that, in this case, it would mean the plaintiffs would forfeit an entire season of Division I football at WVU, along with the related “travel, national exposure, and opportunities for professional advancement or NIL agreements.”
- The equities and public interest favor the athletes.
The Court addressed these issues briefly, finding the equities weighed heavily in the players’ favor and that free and open competition is essential to the American economy. If the NCAA later succeeds on the merits, it can terminate the players’ eligibility.
Ultimately, for these and other reasons detailed in the Court’s 67-page order, Judge Bailey ordered the NCAA to immediately grant Jimmori Robinson, Jeffrey Weimer, Tye Edwards, and Justin Harrington’s waivers of any rule that would prevent them from competing this season due to playing previously at a junior college.
What the Future Holds
What remains to be seen is whether the NCAA will continue taking the position that junior college athletes’ time at non-NCAA schools counts against their NCAA Division I eligibility. Given the financial interests at stake—for both players and the programs who want to sign them—we can certainly expect more cases challenging NCAA decisions that limit the eligibility of former JUCO athletes.
